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STEMMING THE EXPANSION OF THE VOID-FOR-VAGUENESS 
DOCTRINE UNDER JOHNSON 
 
Clancey Henderson* 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
To the average layperson, the phrases felony “crime of violence” and “violent 
felony” may be sufficiently axiomatic to enable proper application of the 
classification to certain crimes.1 However, for some jurists and legal scholars, the 
phrase’s definition and its subsequent applications remain elusive. The Supreme 
Court’s recent decision in Johnson v. United States2 is a prime example of the 
ongoing struggle to pin down the application of the phrase “violent felony” as 
defined by Congress in the Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984 (ACCA).3 In 
Johnson, the Court invalidated a portion of the statutory definition of “violent 
felony”—known as the “residual clause”—because it was too vague.4 Despite the 
Court’s explicit effort to preserve the legitimacy of other statutes defining the phrase 
or other equivalent phrases, 5 the Johnson decision opened a floodgate of litigation 
challenging the constitutionality of those very statutes it sought to excuse. 
Criminal litigators were quick to use the decision to justify collateral attacks on 
sentences imposed under seemingly similar provisions. Several statutory definitions 
were called into question under an extension of the Johnson reasoning, including 
those given in (1) the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), which incorporates 
18 U.S.C. § 16(b),6 (2) the United States Sentencing Guidelines (the “Sentencing 
                                               
* © 2019 Clancey Henderson. J.D. Candidate, 2019, at the S.J. Quinney College of 
Law. I would like to thank my wife for her patience, love, and support throughout my law 
school experience. I offer thanks to Professor Jensie Anderson for teaching me how to 
compose a legal writing and for her help in polishing this paper. Lastly, I thank the Utah Law 
Review editorial board and staff for their editing assistance.  
1 Justice Thomas opined the residual clause allowed “any fool [to] know that a 
particular category of conduct would be within the reach of the statute,” and was thus “not 
unconstitutional on its face.” Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2573 (2015) 
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 112 (1999)). 
2 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015). 
3 Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 2185 (1984) 
(originally codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1202 (1984), now codified at 18 U.S.C. § 924 (2012)). 
4 Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2557. 
5 Id. at 2563, 2561 (noting that “[t]oday’s decision does not call into question 
application of the Act to the four enumerated offenses, or the remainder of the Act’s 
definition of a violent felony” and rebuffing the assertions of “[t]he Government and the 
dissent . . . that dozens of federal and state criminal laws use terms like ‘substantial risk,’ 
‘grave risk,’ and ‘unreasonable risk,’ suggesting that to hold the residual clause 
unconstitutional is to place these provisions in constitutional doubt.” (citations omitted)). 
6 See infra note 66 and accompanying text. 
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Guidelines”),7 and (3) 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(B)’s risk-of-force clause.8 The results 
of these challenges have been mixed and have caused multiple circuit splits.9 
Because of the interrelated nature of the challenges and their bearing on the precious 
rights guaranteed under the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, the Supreme 
Court must eventually confront each attempted extension of Johnson.10 The 
Supreme Court has already considered and upheld the constitutionality of the 
Sentencing Guidelines’ definition in Beckles v. United States.11 But 18 U.S.C. 
§ 16(b) was recently overturned by the Supreme Court in Sessions v. Dimaya.12 It 
seems only a matter of time before the Supreme Court will similarly need to 
determine the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(B)’s risk-of-force clause.  
This Note addresses the constitutionality of the risk-of-force clause. Since 
many of the cases challenging the risk-of-force clause proceed on the argument that 
it is indistinguishable from the ACCA’s residual clause, the history of the residual 
clause is particularly relevant. Addressing the constitutionality of the risk-of-force 
clause will necessarily entail a discussion of whether it is distinguishable from the 
residual clause. Accordingly, brief histories of the ACCA and the residual clause 
will be given. This overview will provide a backdrop to the discussion of the 
Supreme Court’s struggle to define and apply the residual clause in numerous cases 
preceding the decision in Johnson. Understanding the Court’s trouble addressing the 
residual clause is a key component of the comparative analysis that will follow. After 
addressing Johnson as the culmination of the Court’s dealings with the residual 
clause, this Note will address how Johnson serves as a vehicle for challenges to other 
statues under the void-for-vagueness doctrine. The challenges to Johnson are 
presented to establish the certainty of a constitutional challenge coming before the 
Supreme Court concerning the risk-of-force clause. Last, this Note will address the 
constitutionality of the risk-of-force clause under a comparative analysis framework. 
The analysis will ultimately show that § 924(c)(3)(B) is distinguishable from 
previously invalidated statutory definitions and should be upheld as constitutional. 
  
                                               
7 See infra note 62 and accompanying text. 
8 See infra note 98 and accompanying text. 
9 See infra Part I.C.  
10 See Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2556 (“The Fifth Amendment provides that ‘[n]o person 
shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.’ Our cases 
establish that the Government violates this guarantee by taking away someone’s life, liberty, 
or property under a criminal law so vague that it fails to give ordinary people fair notice of 
the conduct it punishes, or so standardless that it invites arbitrary enforcement.” (citing 
Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357–58 (1983)). 
11 137 S. Ct. 886 (2017). 
12 138 S. Ct. 1204 (2018). 
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I.  BACKGROUND 
 
A.  History of the ACCA 
 
The ACCA was enacted during a period in which national legislators sought to 
enhance penalties in order to stem growing crime rates, and in particular, to deter 
repeat offenders.13 The original bill, the Career Criminal Life Sentence Act of 1981, 
proposed a life sentence for repeat felony offenders.14 But, Congress passed the bill 
only after it was revised to include a more lenient sentencing range of “fifteen-years 
to life.”15 That bill, however, was vetoed by President Reagan because of federalism 
concerns—he felt that the bill encroached on the states’ enforcement of the 
traditionally local crimes of armed burglary and armed robbery.16 The mandatory 
sentence enhancements were later modified to apply only to offenders found in 
violation of a federal firearm statute that prohibits felons from possessing firearms.17 
This enabled the bill to overcome the federalism reservations and secured the 
ACCA’s passage.18 Soon after, the ACCA’s scope was broadened considerably by 
the inclusion of the residual clause, which enumerated certain crimes and implicated 
                                               
13 See Sen. Arlen Specter, R-Pa., Thursday introduced two bills that. . . , UPI (Oct. 1, 
1981), https://www.upi.com/Archives/1981/10/01/Sen-Arlen-Specter-R-Pa-Thursday-
introduced-two-bills-that/1351370756800/ [https://perma.cc/6YEY-5BL9] (quoting Senator 
Specter, indicating the bill punished “habitual offenders” because “about two-thirds of 
robberies and burglaries are committed by career criminals”); see also S. REP. NO. 98-190, 
at 3, 6 (1983) (noting robbery and burglary, crimes addressed by the bill, “are more prevalent 
and have increased faster than any other type of violent crime”); James G. Levine, The Armed 
Career Criminal Act and the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines: Moving Toward Consistency, 46 
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 537, 546–48 (2009) (detailing the ACCA’s legislative history); see, e.g., 
Steven D. Levitt, Understanding Why Crime Fell in the 1990s: Four Factors that Explain 
the Decline and Six that Do Not, 18 J. ECON. PERSP. 163, 165 (2004), 
http://pricetheory.uchicago.edu/levitt/Papers/LevittUnderstandingWhyCrime2004.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/F45X-9J83] (confirming that statistics reflect that the “same pattern 
observed for homicide is present for every major crime” and observing that murder rates 
doubled over a 15-year period, “rising to a peak . . . in 1980”). 
14 S. 1688, 97th Cong. § 2 (1981). 
15 S. 52, 98th Cong. § 2 (1st Sess. 1983) (enacted). 
16 Id. § 3 (noting President Reagan would not sign the bill because of his “concern about 
the jurisdictional nature of the local prosecutor’s ‘veto’ power over Federal prosecutions 
contained in the career criminal portion of the bill.”); see also Constitutionality of Federal 
Habitual Offender Legislation, 344 Op. Att’y Gen, Crim. Div. (1981) (“[W]e would observe 
that the bill might be read to impose its substantive requirements on the states in the course 
of their conduct of state prosecution.”). 
17 Levine, supra note 13, at 546–47 (citing H.R. REP. No. 98-1073 (1984)). 
18 Id.  
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other similar crimes.19 This served to incapacitate a greater swath of career criminals, 
beyond burglars and robbers, and reoriented the ACCA to its original intentions.20  
The ACCA, as referenced for the remainder of this Note, is best understood as 
a federal law establishing a fifteen-year mandatory minimum sentencing 
enhancement for the unlawful possession of a firearm by repeat offenders with at 
least three prior convictions for either violent or drug felonies. The ACCA, as 
codified, reads in relevant part:  
 
(1) In the case of a person who violates section 922(g) of this title [as a 
felon in possession of a firearm] and has three previous convictions . . . for 
a violent felony or a serious drug offense, or both, . . . such person shall be 
fined under this title and imprisoned not less than fifteen years, and, 
notwithstanding any other provision of law, the court shall not suspend the 
sentence of, or grant a probationary sentence to, such person . . . . 
(2) As used in this subsection— 
 . . . . 
(B) the term “violent felony” means any crime punishable by 
imprisonment for a term exceeding one year . . . that— 
(i) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened 
use of physical force against the person of another; or 
(ii) is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves use of 
explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a 
serious potential risk of physical injury to another . . . . 21 
 
Section 924(e)(2)(B)(i) is known as the “elements clause.” The latter half of 
924(e)(2)(B)(ii)—which defines “violent felony” as a felony that “otherwise 
involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to 
another,”—is the residual clause which was invalidated by the Supreme Court in 
Johnson.22  
Prior to the invalidation of the ACCA’s residual clause, an estimated 600 
sentences were enhanced by the statute each year.23 Despite the relatively limited 
                                               
19 H.R. REP. NO. 99-849, at 6 (1986); see also Levine, supra note 13, at 547. 
20 Levine, supra note 13. 
21 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (2012). 
22 Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2556–58 (2015). 
23 Caroline Grueskin, 13 Words That Could Mean Freedom for Many: The Debate over 
the Federal Residual Clause, MARSHALL PROJECT (Oct. 19, 2015), 
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2015/10/19/13-words-that-could-mean-freedom-for-
many#.QPbesy5jR [https://perma.cc/L7DL-GBZG]. 
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application of the statutory enhancement,24 many costly appeals resulted25 because 
of the statute’s considerable penalty—a fifteen-year mandatory minimum sentence 
imposed in addition to the underlying crime’s sentence.26 Even measured against the 
subgroup of offenders that get to trial at almost twice the average rate for federal 
criminal defendants (those subject to mandatory minimum sentences), offenders 
sentenced under the ACCA were almost three times more likely to get an appeal.27 
The above average appeal rate was initially spurred by the broad and inexact 
language employed by the statute. The primary issue concerned the ambiguity 
stemming from the definitions for predicate offenses—those which qualified the 
felons’ past conduct to justify the imposition of the statutory enhancement. Even 
greater confusion and uncertainty resulted from a series of Supreme Court decisions 
interpreting the statutory language and its application in conflicting ways.28 The 
Court’s struggle to give form to the statutory definitions was key to the ultimate 
decision to invalidate the residual clause.29 These opinions are addressed below 
briefly for context.  
 
B.  The Court’s Struggle to Apply the ACCA’s Residual Clause 
 
Prior to the decision in Johnson, the Court considered the ACCA’s residual 
clause four times in five years. First, in James v. United States, the Court determined 
the residual clause covers attempted burglary, as defined by Florida state law.30 Less 
                                               
24 Avi M. Kupfer, Note, A Comprehensive Administrative Solution to the Armed Career 
Criminal Act Debacle, 113 MICH. L. REV. 151, 152 n.2 (2014) (citing U.S. SENTENCING 
COMM’N, MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES IN THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM, 
282–84 (2011) and concluding that “approximately 3 percent of federal inmates, qualify for 
the sentencing enhancement.”). 
25 156 CONG. REC. S10,516 (daily ed. Dec. 17, 2010) (statement of Sen. Arlen Specter) 
(expressing disappointment over the “costly and time-consuming [ACCA] litigation at every 
level of the Federal court system . . . .”). 
26 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) (“[N]otwithstanding any other provision of law, the court shall 
not suspend the sentence of, or grant a probationary sentence to, such person with respect to 
the conviction . . . .”); see also id. § 924(c)(1)(D) (“Notwithstanding any other provision of 
law–(i) a court shall not place on probation any person convicted of a violation of this 
subsection; and (ii) no term of imprisonment imposed on a person under this subsection shall 
run concurrently with any other term of imprisonment imposed on the person, including any 
term of imprisonment imposed for the crime of violence or drug trafficking crime during 
which the firearm was used, carried, or possessed.”). 
27 In 2010, 17.4 percent of the defendants sentenced under the ACCA went to trial. U.S. 
SENTENCING COMM’N, MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES IN THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE SYSTEM 284 (2011). 
28 James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192, 228 (2007) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“This indeed 
leaves the lower courts and those subject to this law to sail upon a virtual sea of doubt.”), 
overruled by Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015). 
29 Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2560 (2015). 
30 See James, 550 U.S at 195. 
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than one year later, the clause came before the Court again in Begay v. United 
States.31 This time the Court considered and rejected the applicability of the statute 
to the offense of driving under the influence under New Mexico law.32 Not ten 
months later, the Court again considered the clause in Chambers v. United States 
and determined that it does not cover the offense of failing to report to a penal 
institution under Illinois state law.33 The Court then had a small reprieve from the 
clause and did not address it again for eighteen months until Sykes v. United States, 
at which point it again declined to find that the statute encompassed the offense in 
question, vehicular flight from a law-enforcement officer under Indiana law.34 
Notably, in both James and Sykes, Justice Scalia dissented, questioning the 
constitutionality of the clause.35 But, Scalia’s dissents were absent in Begay and 
Chambers. Justice Scalia, in his dissent in Sykes, noted that the Court’s opinion was 
“an attempt to clarify, for the fourth time since 2007,” the residual clause and only 
served to “produce[] a fourth ad hoc judgment that will sow further confusion.”36 
Despite Justice Scalia’s quip that the Court tries “to include an ACCA residual-
clause case in about every second or third volume of the United States Reports,” he 
was frustrated with the Court’s inability to craft and adhere to a single cognizable 
test in their “tutti-frutti opinion.”37 
By the time the residual clause graced the Court’s docket for the fifth time, the 
frustration voiced by Justice Scalia had spread among the other Justices: “[f]our 
times [was] enough.”38 In the lead up to Johnson, Justice Kennedy, who authored 
Sykes over Justice Scalia’s dissent, expressed uncertainty about the clause.39 
Similarly, Justice Bryer seemed discontent with the confusion his Begay opinion 
generated among the lower courts.40 By the time Johnson was decided, the Court 
had applied four different analyses to a single clause in less than a decade, resulting 
in confusion and frustration.  
                                               
31 553 U.S. 137, 140 (2008), abrogated by Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 
(2015). 
32 Id.  
33 See Chambers v. United States, 555 U.S. 122, 130 (2009), abrogated by Johnson v. 
United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015). 
34 See Sykes v. United States, 564 U.S. 1, 4 (2011), overruled by Johnson v. United 
States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015). 
35 See James, 550 U.S. at 229–30 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (opining that the statute 
contained “shoddy draftsmanship” and the court could rightly “hold it void for vagueness”); 
Sykes, 564 U.S. at 28 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“We should admit that ACCA’s residual 
provision is a drafting failure and declare it void for vagueness.”). 
36 Sykes, 564 U.S. at 28 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
37 Id. at 28, 30. 
38 Id. at 28; see Rory Little, Re-Argument analysis: The votes are not there to sustain 
the residual clause, SCOTUSBLOG (Apr. 22, 2015, 3:11 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/ 
2015/04/re-argument-analysis-the-votes-are-not-there-to-sustain-the-residual-clause/ 
[https://perma.cc/6PXU-GFSB]. 
39 Little, supra note 38. 
40 Id. 
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On June 26, 2015, the Supreme Court held in Johnson that the residual clause 
of the ACCA’s definition of “violent felony” was unconstitutionally vague.41 The 
opinion, written by Justice Scalia, was the last in the series through which the 
Supreme Court struggled to establish a definitive interpretation and application of 
the clause. The Johnson Court summarized the source of the constitutional 
vagueness of the residual clause as follows:  
 
[t]wo features of the residual clause conspire to make it 
unconstitutionally vague. In the first place, the residual clause leaves grave 
uncertainty about how to estimate the risk posed by a crime. It ties the 
judicial assessment of risk to a judicially imagined “ordinary case” of a 
crime, not to real-world facts or statutory elements. How does one go 
about deciding what kind of conduct the “ordinary case” of a crime 
involves? 
. . . .  
At the same time, the residual clause leaves uncertainty about how 
much risk it takes for a crime to qualify as a violent felony.42 
 
In short, the meaning of “violent felony” is more “unpredictabl[e] and 
arbitrar[y] than the Due Process Clause tolerates” because of (1) the indeterminacy 
of measuring the risk posed by a crime and (2) the uncertainty about the level of risk 
necessary for a crime to qualify as a “violent felony.”43 
To reach its conclusion in Johnson, the Court had to take some unusual 
measures. First, it abjured an interpretive canon of judicial restraint, which dictates 
the Court should avoid calling into question a law’s constitutionality where it could 
otherwise be interpreted within the confines of constitutional limitations.44 Similarly 
                                               
41 Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2557 (2015). 
42 Id. at 2557–58.  
43 CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RES. SERV., R41449, ARMED CAREER CRIMINAL ACT (18 
U.S.C. 924(e)): AN OVERVIEW 6 (2015); see also Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2556 (“[T]he 
Government violates [the Fifth Amendment] guarantee by taking away someone’s life, 
liberty, or property under a criminal law so vague that it fails to give ordinary people fair 
notice of the conduct it punishes, or so standardless that it invites arbitrary enforcement.”). 
44 Although the concurring opinion by Justice Brandeis in Ashwander v. Tennessee 
Valley Authority is often used as the primary reference for the doctrine of constitutional 
avoidance, the idea was one of the many offered by Chief Justice Marshall who played a 
pivotal part in shaping the role of the court. See Lisa A. Kloppenberg, Avoiding 
Constitutional Questions, 35 B.C. L. REV. 1003, 1012 (1994) (describing Brandeis’s 
concurrence as “the most significant formulation of the avoidance doctrine.”); Andrew 
Nolan, CONG. RES. SERV., 7-5700, THE DOCTRINE OF CONSTITUTIONAL AVOIDANCE: A 
LEGAL OVERVIEW, 9, 9, n.84 (2014) (observing the portion on constitutional avoidance is 
“the most famous and quoted aspect of the Ashwander concurrence” and noting that 
“Brandeis’s Ashwander concurrence has been cited in 1,279 federal cases” as of 2014.); Ex 
parte Randolph, 20 F. Cas. 242, 254 (C.C.D. Va. 1833) (“No questions can be brought before 
a judicial tribunal of greater delicacy than those which involve the constitutionality of a 
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unusual was the Court’s decision to overturn the piecemeal precedent it had formed 
around the residual clause within just a few years of their prior decisions.45 Last, the 
Court had to expose the vagueness doctrine as being broader than previously 
understood by some, and potentially expose other statutes to “constitutional 
doubt.”46 
Despite the unusual measures necessary to reach the decision, a majority of the 
Court felt justified under the circumstances. The Court had previously intimated to 
Congress that the drafting was subpar and needed to be addressed.47 Indeed, before 
Johnson, Congress’s legal advisors made note of the Court’s difficulty interpreting 
the statute.48 After five cases and almost ten years of inaction by Congress, the Court 
was indeed “tired of the [ACCA]” and “[a]nxious to rid [its] docket of bothersome 
residual clause cases.”49 At the conclusion of the ordeal, the Court simply could not 
use the residual clause’s guidance to craft a consistently applicable principle with 
which to differentiate crimes posing a serious risk of injury from those that do not.50 
So, rather than continuing to take on the residual clause’s ambiguity repeatedly on a 
case-by-case basis, the Court foreclosed the discussion by ruling the clause 
                                               
legislative act. If they become indispensably necessary to the case, the court must meet and 
decide them; but if the case may be determined on other points, a just respect for the 
legislature requires, that the obligation of its laws should not be unnecessarily and wantonly 
assailed.”). It wasn’t for another one hundred years that the doctrine was articulated by 
Justice Brandeis as a list of seven loosely related rules restraining the court from issuing 
broad holdings on matters of constitutional law. See Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 
297 U.S. 288, 346–48 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring). Over time, the Court has 
reemphasized the importance of this fundamental doctrine. Although, the Court does not treat 
the doctrine as paramount and has on a number of occasions hedged it in order to reach a 
conclusion that a law is constitutionally invalid, as in the current case.  
45 See Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2573 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“So brushing aside stare 
decisis, the Court holds that the residual clause is unconstitutionally vague even though we 
have twice rejected that very argument within the last eight years.”). 
46 Id. at 2561 (majority opinion). 
47 See Sykes v. United States, 564 U.S. 1, 35 (2011) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Congress 
can quickly add what it wishes.”); James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192, 230 (2011) (Scalia, 
J., dissenting) (“Congress has simply abdicated its responsibility when it passes a criminal 
statute insusceptible of an interpretation that enables principled, predictable 
application . . . .”); Chambers v. United States, 555 U.S. 122, 134 (2009) (Alito, J., 
concurring) (“At this point, the only tenable, long-term solution is for Congress to formulate 
a specific list of expressly defined crimes that are deemed to be worthy of ACCA’s 
sentencing enhancement.”); Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 142–43 (2008) 
(discussing the court’s division in determining the intent of Congress in regard to the residual 
clause). 
48 See LARRY M. EIG, CONG. RES. SERV., 97-589, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: 
GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND RECENT TRENDS 12–13, 13 n.72 (2014). 
49 Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2573 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
50 United States v. Snyder, 793 F.3d 1241, 1245 (10th Cir. 2015) (quoting Johnson, 135 
S. Ct. at 2558). 
 
2019] VOID-FOR-VAGUENESS DOCTRINE 245 
 
unconstitutionally vague.51 But the ruling was not without consequence. Just as some 
feared, Johnson opened the door for litigants seeking to invalidate other clauses 
bearing a seemingly similar degree of ambiguity.52  
 
C.  Johnson as a Vehicle to Challenge the Constitutionality of Other Statutes 
 
Johnson had an immediate impact. Within weeks, the United States Sentencing 
Commission determined that it would amend the Sentencing Guidelines, which used 
language identical to that of the residual clause.53 Shortly thereafter, the federal 
courts of appeals reached different conclusions on the retroactive applicability of 
Johnson.54 In an ironic twist, within a year of Johnson, the residual clause was again 
before the Supreme Court to resolve this circuit split. The Court then made 
Johnson’s holding retroactive to cases on collateral review in Welch v. United 
States.55 Welch temporarily opened the floodgates of litigation for review of 
sentences enhanced under the ACCA’s residual clause. But, it also had the 
unintended consequence of further fomenting litigation of other clauses bearing 
some similarities to the ACCA’s residual clause.  
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, prisoners can seek review of their conviction if they 
file a motion within one year of the date on which the right asserted is initially 
recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right is made retroactively applicable on 
collateral review.56 Johnson recognized a new right which, having been made 
retroactively applicable, enabled prisoners sentenced under the residual clause to 
petition the court to reduce or vacate their sentences.57 However, because Welch was 
decided several months after Johnson, prisoners had a little over two months to file 
a habeas petition for collateral review of a sentence based on the right recognized by 
Johnson. With little time for interpretation or application by the federal courts, 
                                               
51 Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2560 (“Nine years’ experience trying to derive meaning from 
the residual clause convinces us that we have embarked upon a failed enterprise.”). 
52 Id. at 2577 (Alito, J., dissenting) (expressing concerns that the opinion was a “nuclear 
explosion” and could invalidate “scores of federal and state laws”). 
53 Press Release, U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, U.S. Sentencing Commission Seeks 
Comment on Revisions to Definition of Crime of Violence (Aug. 7, 2015), 
http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/news/press-releases-and-news-advisories/press-
releases/20150807_Press_Release.pdf [https://perma.cc/2XW6-QXEA]. Oddly, this 
reaction proved seemingly unnecessary as the Court subsequently ruled in Beckles v. United 
States that the Sentencing Guidelines were not implicated by Johnson because the Guidelines 
are advisory and thus not subject to a vagueness challenge. See Beckles v. United States, 137 
S. Ct. 886, 892 (2017). 
54 See Brian Toth, On Johnson Retroactivity, the Eleventh Circuit Splits with the 
Seventh Circuit, SDFLA BLOG (Aug. 12, 2015), http://sdfla.blogspot.com/2015/08/on-
johnson-retroactivity-eleventh.html [https://perma.cc/JPU2-WPFG]. 
55 136 S. Ct. 1257, 1265 (2016). 
56 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(3) (2012). 
57 Id.; Welch, 136 S. Ct. at 1264 (“It is undisputed that Johnson announced a new rule.”). 
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prisoners liberally invoked the Court’s decision and sought review of statutes 
beyond the ACCA’s residual clause under broad readings of Johnson. Some courts 
permitted these broad readings and others rejected the notion that Johnson supplied 
the right necessary to challenge statutes beyond the residual clause.58 This confusion 
among the district courts permeated to the federal courts of appeals, resulting in 
another circuit split.59  
Among the language to which petitioners tried to extend Johnson was the 
definition of “crime of violence” articulated in the Sentencing Guidelines.60 After a 
circuit split emerged, the Supreme Court took a Ninth Circuit case to resolve the 
question.61 The case was the first to reach the Supreme Court that questioned the 
extension of Johnson beyond the residual clause. In Beckles v. United States,62 the 
Court upheld the Sentencing Guidelines’ definition for “crime of violence,” not 
under some permissible application of the Johnson standard, but because the 
Sentencing Guidelines are advisory and thus not vulnerable to a vagueness 
challenge.63 
Similar challenges were raised under Johnson against the INA,64 which 
incorporated 18 U.S.C. § 16(b)’s definition of “crime of violence.” This was done 
in order to contest crimes of violence qualifying as deportable offenses.65 This 
application also led to a circuit split, and the question went before the Supreme Court 
in Sessions v. Dimaya.66 Dimaya was the second case to address the extension of 
                                               
58 See, e.g., United States v. Maldonado, 636 F. App’x 807, 810 (2d Cir. 2016) 
(assuming the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Johnson applies to U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2)). But 
see, e.g., United States v. Gonzalez-Longoria, 831 F.3d 670, 679 (5th Cir. 2016), order 
vacated on reh’g, No. 16-6259, 2018 WL 3013812 (U.S. June 18, 2018), and cert. granted, 
judgment vacated, No. 16-6259, 2018 WL 3013812 (U.S. June 18, 2018) (determining that 
Johnson did not extend to the INA’s § 16(b)). 
59 See infra note 99 and accompanying text. 
60 United States v. Gonzalez-Longoria, 831 F.3d 670, 674 (5th Cir. 2016), abrogated 
by Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204 (2018). 
61 Id. at 679; Dimaya v. Lynch, 803 F.3d 1110, 1115 (9th Cir. 2015), aff’d sub nom. 
Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204 (2018). 
62 137 S. Ct. 886 (2017). 
63 Id. at 892. 
64 Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, H.R. 2580; Pub. L. 89–236, 79 Stat. 911, 
(1965). 
65 See Katherine Brady, Some Felonies Should No Longer Be “Crimes of Violence” for 
Immigration Purposes, under Johnson v. United States, IMMIGRANT LEGAL RESOURCE CTR. 
1 (2015) https://www.ilrc.org/sites/default/ files/resources/johnson_v_us_ilrc_adv_8_2015_ 
pdf_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/U7MF-KLKD] (“Conviction of a state offense that meets the 
definition of a crime of violence (COV) at 18 USC § 16 has two potential immigration 
penalties. If committed against a victim with whom the defendant shared a protected 
domestic relationship, a COV may be a deportable crime of domestic violence. If a sentence 
of a year or more is imposed, a COV is an aggravated felony, regardless of the type of 
victim.” (citations omitted)). 
66 138 S. Ct. 1204, 1210 (2018). 
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Johnson’s holding to statutes other than the residual clause. But the resolution of 
Dimaya did not adjudicate the underlying question of whether Johnson and its newly 
created right apply beyond the residual clause. Rather, the Court used the same 
standards of vagueness articulated in Johnson to summarily find the statute 
unconstitutional.67 The outcome of Dimaya holds particular relevance to the risk-of-
force clause because the two statutes share identical language.68 However, the 
Dimaya holding does not directly address the risk-of-force clause and its unique 
factors.69 
Not surprisingly, a similar split in opinion has also resulted as the appellate 
courts have considered vagueness challenges to the risk-of-force clause in 
§ 924(c)(3)(B). The statutory language has been challenged with mixed success 
among some circuits and is still being considered in others.70 Given the related nature 
of the argument to extend Johnson and the existing circuit split, it is likely the statute 
will eventually be challenged before the Supreme Court.71 It is in this context that 
this Note now turns to discuss § 924(c)(3)(B) and concludes that it is not 
unconstitutionally vague under Johnson.  
 
D.  18 U.S.C. § 924(c) in Perspective 
 
Mandatory minimum sentence enhancements are present in two federal firearm 
statutes: the ACCA and § 924(c).72 Section 924(c), as part of the Gun Control Act 
of 1968, predates the ACCA.73 However, the sections defining a crime of violence 
                                               
67 Id. at 1216. 
68 Compare 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) (2012), with 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(B) (2012) (defining 
a crime of violence, in part, as a crime “that by its nature, involves a substantial risk that 
physical force against the person or property of another may be used in the course of 
committing the offense.”). 
69 Despite the identical language of the two provisions, several factors distinguish the 
two provisions which would necessitate separate consideration. See infra Part II.A. 
Additionally, the judgment on the unconstitutionality only facially prejudices a future 
consideration of the risk-of-force clause under the reaffirmed rule for vagueness 
determination. But given that there are distinguishing factors between the two statutes, the 
Court may wish to revisit its void-for-vagueness doctrine in the near future to stem the tide 
of new litigation, which has arisen as a (mostly) unforeseen consequence.  
70 See infra note 99 and accompanying text. 
71 It is worth noting that at least one circuit court has reversed its position on the risk-
of-force clause in a decision following Dimaya. See United States v. Salas, 889 F.3d 681, 
683 (10th Cir. 2018). While others may similarly follow, it is unlikely that all will equate the 
two statutory provisions. Rather some may join the unique position of the Sixth Circuit, 
which is the only court to have found § 16(b) unconstitutionally vague, yet upheld § 
924(c)(3)(B) as constitutional. See Shuti v Lynch, 828 F.3d 440, 449–51 (6th Cir. 2016).  
72 CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RES. SERV., R41412, FEDERAL MANDATORY MINIMUM 
SENTENCING: THE 18 U.S.C. 924(C) TACK-ON IN CASES INVOLVING DRUGS OR VIOLENCE 1 
(2015). 
73 See Gun Control Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90–618, 82 Stat. 1224 (1968). 
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were not added until Congress passed the Firearm Owner’s Protection Act of 1986.74 
While the ACCA addresses recidivists, as previously mentioned, § 924(c) mandates 
additional periods of incarceration any time a firearm is used or possessed during 
and in relation to a federal crime of violence or a drug trafficking crime.75 The statute 
provides enhancements based on factors including the various types of firearms, the 
manner of the firearm’s employment relative to the crime, and whether the charge 
is a first-time offense or one among several violations.76 It has been subject to several 
challenges before the Supreme Court77 since its inception and has been amended 
various times.78 It has been upheld against several constitutional challenges, 
including the right to bear arms under the Second Amendment;79 the prohibition 
against cruel and unusual punishment guaranteed by the Eighth Amendment;80 the 
                                               
74 Firearm Owner’s Protection Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-308, 100 Stat. 449, 457 
(1986).  
75 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) (2012); see also Michael J. Riordan, Using a Firearm 
During and in Relation to a Drug Trafficking Crime: Defining the Elements of the Mandatory 
Sentencing Provision of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1), 30 DUQ. L. REV. 39, 40 (1991) (“The change 
was primarily attributable to the bipartisan belief that rehabilitation of criminals was difficult 
to accomplish and by widespread dissatisfaction with judicial discretion in sentencing, which 
critics argued actually exacerbated the problems of controlling crime. This dissatisfaction 
resulted in renewed support for mandatory minimum penalties, especially for crimes 
involving narcotics offenses.” (citations omitted)). 
76 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) (2012). 
77 DOYLE, supra note 72, at 12–21. 
78 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (1970); Pub. L. No. 91–644, § 13, 84 Stat. 1889 (codified as 
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (1976)); Pub. L. No. 98–473, § 1005, 98 Stat. 2138 (codified 
as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (1982)); Pub. L. No. 99–308, 100 Stat. 457 (1986); Pub. 
L. No. 100–690, § 6460, 102 Stat. 4373 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (1988)); 
Pub. L. No. 101–647, § 1101, 104 Stat. 4829 (1990); Pub. L. No. 105–386, § 1, 112 Stat. 
3469 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (2000)); Pub. L. No. 109–92, § 6(b), 119 
Stat. 2102 (2005). One example is that the statute originally condemned the “use” of a 
firearm. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (1970). But, the Supreme Court found the word “use” anticipates 
more than possession. Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 143 (1995) (noting that § 924(c) 
“requires evidence sufficient to show . . . a use that makes the firearm an operative 
factor . . . . ‘[U]se’ must connote more than mere possession . . . .”). So, Congress amended 
the language in 1998 to outlaw both use and possession “in furtherance” of a predicate 
offense. Pub. L. No. 105–386 § 1, 112 Stat. 3469 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) 
(2000)). 
79 See, e.g., United States v. Napolitan, 762 F.3d 297, 311 (3d Cir. 2014); United States 
v. Bryant, 711 F.3d 364, 368–69 (2d Cir. 2013); United States v. Potter, 630 F.3d 1260, 1261 
(9th Cir. 2011); United States v. Jackson, 555 F.3d 635, 636 (7th Cir. 2009). 
80 See, e.g., United States v. Richardson, 793 F.3d 612, 633–34 (6th Cir. 2015), vacated, 
136 S. Ct. 1157 (mem.), remanded in light of Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 
(2015); United States v. Haile, 685 F.3d 1211, 1222 (11th Cir. 2012); United States v. Major, 
676 F.3d 803, 812 (9th Cir. 2012); United States v. Thomas, 627 F.3d 146, 160 (5th Cir. 
2010). 
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right to trial by jury under the Sixth Amendment;81 the Fifth Amendment’s 
proscriptions of double jeopardy and due process;82 the constitutional structure for 
separation of powers;83 and congressional authority granted under the Commerce 
Clause.84 
Because a court may not circumvent the sentence enhancements called for by 
§ 924(c) by ordering concurrent sentences,85 imposing a probationary sentence,86 nor 
artificially reducing the sentence of the predicate offense,87 sentences under § 924(c) 
are especially potent.88 In addition, a criminal series—which involves multiple acts 
qualifying as predicate offenses—“trigger[s] enhanced mandatory minimum 
penalties” and allows the court to impose enhanced sentences for multiple 
violations.89 This makes prisoners all the more desperate to seek its invalidation.  
                                               
81 See United States v. Smith, 775 F.3d 1262, 1266 (11th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 
S. Ct. 2827 (2015); United States v. Hunter, 770 F.3d 740, 745–46 (8th Cir. 2014), cert. 
denied, 135 S. Ct. 2338 (2014). 
82 See United States v. Catalan-Roman, 585 F.3d 453, 471–72 (1st Cir. 2009), cert. 
denied, 560 U.S. 948 (2010); United States v. Khan, 461 F.3d 477, 493–94 (4th Cir. 2006), 
cert. denied, 550 U.S. 956 (2007). 
83 See United States v. Major, 676 F.3d 803, 811 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. 
Ct. 280 (2012); United States v. Walker, 473 F.3d 71, 75–76 (3d Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 
127 S. Ct. 1924 (2007). 
84 See United States v. Belfast, 611 F.3d 783, 815–16 (11th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 
562 U.S. 1236 (2011); United States v. Lynch, 367 F.3d 1148, 1158 (9th Cir. 2004), aff’d, 
437 F.3d 902 (9th Cir. 2006); United States v. Miller, 283 F.3d 907, 913–14 (8th Cir. 2002), 
cert. denied, 537 U.S. 871 (2002). 
85 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(D)(ii) (2012). 
86 Id. § 924(c)(1)(D)(i).  
87 E.g., United States v. Chavez, 549 F.3d 119, 135 (2d Cir. 2008) (confirming the 
district court’s conclusion that it is “not permitted to reduce that prison term [for an 
underlying offense] on account of the mandatory minimum sentence provided by § 
924(c) . . . ”); United States v. Hatcher, 501 F.3d 931, 933–34 (8th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 
552 U.S. 1170 (2008) (holding that the sentence enhancement provided by § 924 must be 
imposed independently of the sentence for the underlying crime); United States v. Franklin, 
499 F.3d 578, 583 (6th Cir. 2007) (“[The] statutory language reflects the intent of Congress 
that the § 924(c)(1) sentence must be imposed ‘in addition to’ a reasonable guideline range 
sentence.”); United States v. Roberson, 474 F.3d 432, 437 (7th Cir. 2007) (“The district judge 
was therefore required to determine the proper sentence for the bank robbery entirely 
independently of the section 924(c)(1) add-on . . . .”); see S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 312–14 
(1984) (“Section 924(c) sets out an offense distinct from the underlying felony and is not 
simply a penalty provision.”). 
88 See DOYLE, supra note 72, at 9. 
89 Id. at 9, 9 n.76 (“[M]ultiple underlying offenses support multiple § 924(c)(1) 
convictions” (alterations in original) (quoting United States v. Sandstrom, 594 F.3d 634, 658 
(8th Cir. 2010)); see also United States v. Catalàn-Roman, 585 F.3d 453, 472 (1st Cir. 2009); 
United States v. Penney, 576 F.3d 297, 316 (6th Cir. 2009) (“[W]hen ‘two separate predicate 
offenses for triggering § 924(c)(1) were charged and proven,’ a defendant may be convicted 
and sentenced for two separate crimes, even if both offenses were committed in the course 
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With an understanding of the fundamental purpose, history, and complications 
of the clauses, this Note can proceed to juxtapose the residual clause with the risk-
of-force clause found in § 924(c)(3)(B). This is necessary because advocates of a 
broad reading of Johnson enjoyed some level of success with statutes beyond the 
residual clause. Given the previous success of cases argued under an expansive 
reading of Johnson, this Note forecasts that the current circuit split concerning the 
risk-of-force clause will inevitably come before the Supreme Court soon and turns 
to discuss whether the risk-of-force clause is unconstitutionally vague in light of 
Johnson.  
 
II.  ANALYSIS 
 
“Importing a definition from a different statute, even with identical language, 
has serious implications on the constitutionality of the Act.”90 Consequently, an 
analysis of the risk-of-force clause should be independent of any assumption that it 
bares any meaningful similarity to the residual clause with which it is often 
associated, or even that of the identical language used in § 16(b).91 But, because the 
cases which consider the constitutional vagueness of the risk-of-force clause do so 
in light of Johnson and Dimaya—out of procedural necessity—rather than 
independently, the analysis will proceed in kind. Therefore, the question becomes 
whether the risk-of-force clause can be distinguished from the residual clause and 
whether it is distinguishable from the INA statute. Additionally, this Note begins 
with the presumption that all statutes are constitutional.92  
                                               
of the same event.” (quoting United States v. Naboor, 901 F.2d 1351, 1357–58 (6th Cir. 
1990))); United States v. Looney, 532 F.3d 392, 397 (5th Cir. 2008).  
90 Raymond E. Gazer, The Presumption of Innocence: Why Should the Accused Care 
Whether He Is Being Detained Before Trial for Regulatory or Punitive Reasons? Jail Is Still 
Jail: Re-Examining the Judicial Gloss that Has Diluted the Bail Reform, 25 PACE L. REV. 
355, 360 (2005). 
91 Chief Justice Roberts notes his concern of an out-of-control void-for-vagueness 
doctrine and the potential invalidation of other statutes in subsequent rulings. Session v. 
Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204, 1241 (2018) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“In addition, § 16 serves 
as the universal definition of ‘crime of violence’ for all of Title 18 of the United States Code. 
Its language is incorporated into many procedural and substantive provisions of criminal law, 
including provisions concerning racketeering, money laundering, domestic violence, using a 
child to commit a violent crime, and distributing information about the making or use of 
explosives. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 25(a)(1), 842(p)(2), 1952(a), 1956(c)(7)(B)(ii), 1959(a) (4), 
2261(a), 3561(b). Of special concern, § 16 is replicated in the definition of ‘crime of 
violence’ applicable to § 924(c), which prohibits using or carrying a firearm ‘during and in 
relation to any crime of violence,’ or possessing a firearm ‘in furtherance of any such crime.’ 
§§ 924(c)(1)(A), (c)(3).”). 
92 United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629, 635 (1883) (“Proper respect for a co-ordinate 
branch of the government requires the courts of the United States to give effect to the 
presumption that Congress will pass no act not within its constitutional power. This 
presumption should prevail unless the lack of constitutional authority to pass an act in 
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“The prohibition of vagueness in criminal statutes ‘is a well-recognized 
requirement, consonant alike with ordinary notions of fair play and the settled rules 
of law,’ and a statute that flouts it ‘violates the first essential of due process.’”93 In 
brief review, Johnson held that the residual clause of the ACCA was “so vague that 
it fail[ed] to give ordinary people fair notice of the conduct it punishes, or so 
standardless that it invite[d] arbitrary enforcement.”94 The Court found there was a 
two-tiered problem, the clause left “grave uncertainty about how to estimate the risk 
posed by a crime,” as well as “how much risk it takes for a crime to qualify as a 
violent felony.”95 It was the aggregate uncertainty—the combination of 
unpredictability and arbitrariness—not just the formulaic uncertainties, that made 
the residual clause unconstitutionally vague.96 Johnson does not invalidate all other 
“risk clauses” for this reason.97  
The extension of Johnson to the risk-of-force clause has been addressed by 
various courts of appeals, the majority of which reject the argument and uphold the 
statute as constitutional,98 at least prior to Dimaya.99 In doing so, the courts have 
proposed a number of factors which distinguish the risk-of-force clause from the 
                                               
question is clearly demonstrated.”). For an interesting discussion of the doctrine in its early 
formation, see generally Note, The Presumption of Constitutionality, 31 COLUM. L. REV. 
1136 (1931). 
93 Golicov v. Lynch, 837 F.3d 1065, 1068 (10th Cir. 2016) (quoting Johnson v. United 
States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2556–57 (2015)). 
94 Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2556 (internal quotations omitted). 
95 Id. at 2557–58; see Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1257, 1262 (2016) (observing 
that the ACCA clause failed because it “required courts to assess the hypothetical risk posed 
by an abstract generic version of the offense”). 
96 See Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2558. 
97 Id. at 2561, 2563 (concluding criminal laws using terms like “substantial risk,” “grave 
risk,” and “unreasonable risk,” were not called into question). 
98 See United States v. Eshetu, 863 F.3d 946, 955 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (making special 
mention of the Supreme Court’s unanimous decisions in response to the language used in the 
risk-of-force clause, but noting the Court’s division when the residual clause was at issue); 
Ovalles v. United States, 861 F.3d 1257, 1263 (11th Cir. 2017) (“Johnson does not apply to 
or invalidate § 924(c)(3)(B).”); United States v. Davis, 677 F. App’x 933, 936 (5th Cir. 2017) 
(“Johnson does not invalidate § 924(c)(3)(B).”); United States v. Prickett, 839 F.3d 697, 699 
(8th Cir. 2016) (holding that § 924(c)(3)(B) is considerably narrower than the ACCA’s 
residual clause and much of Johnson’s analysis does not apply to it); Hill, 832 F.3d 135, 146 
(2nd Cir. 2016) (“[T]he Supreme Court’s explanation for its conclusion in [Johnson] renders 
that case inapplicable to the risk-of-force clause.”); United States v. Graham, 824 F.3d 421, 
424 n.1 (4th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (rejecting vagueness challenge under plain error review); 
United States v. Taylor, 814 F.3d 340, 375–76 (6th Cir. 2016) (holding § 924(c)(3)(B) as 
constitutional despite holdings by the Seventh and Ninth Circuits invalidating 18 U.S.C. 
§ 16(b)). But see United States v. Cardena, 842 F.3d 959, 996 (7th Cir. 2016) (holding that 
because a previous ruling found § 16(b) unconstitutionally vague and because the language 
is identical, “the residual clause in 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(B) is also unconstitutionally 
vague”). 
99 See supra note 71. 
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residual clause. These factors are incorporated into the broader debate as 
springboards for reasoned discussion. Factors largely emphasized in Dimaya, which 
support an opposing conclusion, are also addressed to demonstrate why they are an 
insufficient basis for concluding that the risk-of-force clause is unconstitutionally 
vague. Each of the factors addressed below demonstrates how the risk-of-force 
clause has less aggregate ambiguity than the residual clause—a key distinction given 
the Court’s concern over the summation of the “grave uncertainty” involved in 
determining whether an underlying crime qualified under the residual clause.100 The 
distinguishing factors can be separated into two categories: textual differences and 
contextual differences.  
 
A.  Textually Differentiating § 924(c)(3)(B) 
 
The first source of distinction is found by comparing the text of the clauses. 
The risk-of-force clause defines “crime of violence” as an offense that is a felony 
and “that by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the 
person or property of another may be used in the course of committing the 
offense.”101 In contrast, the residual clause defines violent felony as a felony that 
“otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury 
to another.”102 The plain reading of the statutes provides three easily discernable 
differences. These are: (1) a focus on conduct using physical force rather than the 
resultant physical injury;103 (2) the inclusion of the phrase “by its nature” in only the 
risk-of-force clause;104 and (3) a restriction unique to the risk-of-force clause.105  
The first textual factor which distinguishes the risk-of-force clause from the 
residual clause is that “the statutory language of § 924(c)(3)(B) is distinctly 
narrower, especially because it deals with physical force rather than physical 
injury.”106 The difference between the two is that one concerns a result, while the 
other concerns conduct.107 The statute concerned with the result of physical injury 
encompasses more offenses because it includes conduct lacking a violent aspect, like 
                                               
100 Session v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204, 1240 (2018) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“The 
decision emphasized that it was the ‘sum’ of the ‘uncertainties’ in the ACCA residual clause, 
confirmed by years of experience, that ‘convince[d]’ us the provision was beyond salvage.” 
(citing Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2560)).  
101 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3) (2012). 
102 Id. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii). 
103 Infra notes 106–118 and accompanying text. 
104 Infra notes 106–118 and accompanying text. 
105 Infra notes 106–118 and accompanying text. 
106 United States v. Taylor, 814 F.3d 340, 376 (6th Cir. 2016); United States v. Serafin, 
562 F.3d 1105, 1109 (10th Cir. 2009) (finding the risk of use of force is narrower than risk 
of injury) overruled by United States v. Salas, 889 F.3d 681 (10th Cir. 2018). 
107 Compare 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) (2012) (“risk of physical injury to another”) 
(emphasis added), with 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(B) (2012) (“risk that physical force . . . be 
used”) (emphasis added). 
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drunk driving.108 Accordingly, the statute concerned with the conduct using physical 
force necessarily is limited to fewer offenses and therefore permits less ambiguity.109 
This is especially true in light of the Court’s decision in Leocal v. Ashcroft,110 which 
narrowed the definition of “use of physical force against another person” to 
“suggest[] a category of violent, active crimes.”111 This qualification supports the 
conclusion that the “[r]isk of physical force against a victim is much more definite 
than risk of physical injury to a victim.”112 Logically speaking, it is far easier to 
judge whether a crime is violent by how it is conducted than by the potential 
consequences of the crime.113 Thus, judgments under the risk-of-force clause are less 
likely to be imposed arbitrarily. 
In Dimaya, the Court sidelines this distinction, citing a recent opinion holding 
that “‘physical force’ means ‘force capable of causing physical pain or injury.’”114 
There, the Court lost sight of the forest for the trees in trying to equate physical force 
with resultant injury. In attempting to discount this important factor, the Court 
overlooked the statute’s context. The requirement for physical force goes to the 
intentional aspect of the action taken, not just the outcome of the action.115 The spirit 
and intent of the statute are manifestly obvious when read as a whole. The statute 
seeks to cover criminal conduct that purposefully or “actively” exercises physical 
force, rather than conduct which incidentally results in harm.116 The interpretation 
                                               
108 This was the question at issue in Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137 (2008). 
Ultimately, the Court decided driving under the influence is not a violent felony, despite the 
fact that “[d]runk driving is an extremely dangerous crime,” which in the preceding year 
“claimed the lives of more than 17,000 individuals and harmed untold amounts of property.” 
Begay, 553 U.S. at 141–42 (citations omitted). 
109 See supra note 107 and accompanying text. 
110 543 U.S. 1 (2004). 
111 See id. at 11 (finding that under § 16(b) the “use of physical force against another 
person . . . suggests a category of violent, active crimes”); see also United States v. Serafin, 
562 F.3d 1105, 1114 (10th Cir. 2009) (applying Leocal to § 924(c) so that the analysis 
focuses on whether the nature of the offense causes physical force to actually arise in the 
course of the offense, rather than the possibility of it arising in the result). 
112 United States v. Taylor, 814 F.3d 340, 376–77 (6th Cir. 2016). 
113 Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204, 1237 (2018) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
114 Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. at 1208 (majority opinion) (quoting Johnson v. United States, 
559 U.S. 133, 140 (2010)).  
115 See id. at 1236–37 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“The difference is that [physical force] 
asks about the risk that the offender himself will actively employ force against person or 
property. That language does not sweep in all instances in which the offender's acts, or 
another person’s reaction, might result in unintended or negligent harm.”). 
116 Id. This is consistent with the requirement that courts read into a statute the scienter 
necessary to separate wrongful conduct from innocent conduct. See Elonis v. United States, 
135 S. Ct. 2001, 2009 (2015) (“We therefore generally ‘interpret [ ] criminal statutes to 
include broadly applicable scienter requirements, even where the statute by its terms does 
not contain them.’” (quoting United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 70 
(1994))). 
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of physical force offered by the Court before it fully scrapped the residual clause in 
disregard for much of the reasoning presented in Johnson117 hardly qualifies as 
justification to treat a better-tailored statute as its equal.118  
Second, the risk-of-force clause “also contains the ‘narrowing aspects’ of . . . 
‘requiring that the felony be one which “by its nature” involves the risk that the 
offender will use physical force.’”119 This differs from the residual clause’s 
requirement that conduct merely “involve” a risk of injury. The phrase “by its 
nature” is absent from the residual clause and must be given meaning.120 The phrase 
indicates that a court should focus on the nature of the felony in question. Unlike the 
residual clause, the risk-of-force clause does not permit “a court to consider risk-
related conduct beyond that which is an element of the predicate crime.”121 So, courts 
have no need to look to a “judicially imagined ‘ordinary case’ of a crime” because 
an offense is only a valid predicate if every conceivable conviction includes the risk 
of the use of physical force.122 This is starkly different from the residual clause, 
which required courts to look to an “ordinary case” under the categorical approach—
meaning that an offense would qualify if it ordinarily involves a risk of injury, even 
if a particular commission might lack a violent element.123 “The mere fact that a 
                                               
117 Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. at 1240 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
118 See id. at 1236 (“But the Court too readily dismisses the significant textual 
distinctions between § 16(b) and the ACCA residual clause.”). 
119 United States v. Prickett, 839 F.3d 697, 699 (8th Cir. 2016) (quoting United States 
v. Taylor, 814 F.3d 340, 377 (6th Cir. 2016)); see also Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 
2551, 2557 (2015) (holding that under the ACCA clause, a “court’s task goes beyond 
deciding whether creation of risk is an element of the crime” because the question becomes 
“whether the crime ‘involves conduct’ that presents too much risk of physical injury.”). But 
see United States v. Vivas-Ceja, 808 F.3d 719, 722 (7th Cir. 2015) (opining that the phrases 
“by its nature” and “involves conduct” are synonymous). 
120 The rule to avoid surplusage indicates that each word or phrase has a meaning and 
use in the broader text and any interpretation that renders the word or phrase meaningless 
should be rejected. Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 574 (1995) (“[T]he Court will 
avoid a reading which renders some words altogether redundant.” (citing United States v. 
Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 538–39 (1955)); see WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE ET AL., CASES AND 
MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 833 (3d. ed. 
2001). 
121 Taylor, 814 F.3d at 377. 
122 Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2554; see United States v. Hart, 578 F.3d 674, 681 (7th Cir. 
2009) (determining that federal escape could be committed without violent force and 
therefore it was not, as a categorical matter, a crime of violence); see also Mathis v. United 
States, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2251 (2016) (“[A] state crime cannot qualify as an ACCA predicate 
if its elements are broader than those of a listed generic offense.”). 
123 The categorical approach is generally used to apply an enhancement provision and 
“look[s] only to the fact of conviction and the statutory definition of the predicate offense, 
rather than to the particular underlying facts.” Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 576 
(1990). Appellate courts are beginning to reject this approach when considering whether the 
risk-of-force clause applies since a conviction under a § 924(c) offense is concurrently 
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crime could be committed without a risk of physical harm does not exclude it from 
the statute’s reach” because “the residual clause speaks of ‘potential risk[s],’ . . . 
suggesting ‘that Congress intended to encompass possibilities even more contingent 
or remote than a simple “risk,” much less a certainty.’”124  
Such a commission—one lacking a substantial risk of the use of violent force—
is not possible under the risk-of-force clause. This is because the language indicates 
that such a risk is inherent within the criminal elements required to secure a 
conviction for the predicate offense, even if it is not facially present in the criminal 
statute.125 This is a distinction the Court largely ignores in Dimaya,126 except for 
Justice Gorsuch, who signaled in a concurring opinion his interest in exploring a 
meaningful interpretation of the language.127  
  
                                               
determined with the underlying offense. United States v. Kennedy, 720 F. App’x 104, 110 
(3d Cir. 2017) (“[T]he rationales for applying the categorical approach were not present 
when the predicate offense was tried contemporaneously before the same court.” (citing 
United States v. Robinson, 844 F.3d 137, 142 (3rd Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 1601 
(2018))); United States v. Cravens, No. 16-8111, 2017 WL 6559798, at *8 (10th Cir. Dec. 
19, 2017) (“It is time to re-think our use of the categorical approach in § 924(c) cases.”). 
This further distinguishes the two statutes and their potential for arbitrary application by 
eliminating the uncertainty inherit in post-conviction determinations of an offense’s violent 
nature. But see Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204, 1231 (2018) (Gorsuch, J., concurring).  
124 Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2582 (Alito, J., dissenting) (quoting James v. United States, 
550 U.S. 192, 207–208 (2007)).  
125 It is worth noting that the risk-of-force clause is less expansive than the residual 
clause in that it does not include offenses with potential risk, only those with substantial risk. 
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has defined physical force as “violent force - that is, force 
capable of causing physical pain or injury to another person.” Johnson v. United States, 559 
U.S. 133, 140 (2010); accord United States v. Ventura-Perez, 666 F.3d 670, 674 (10th Cir. 
2012) (“The Court construed physical force to require ‘violent force.’”). Indicating that an 
offense with a substantial risk of physical force is seen as one which bears a strong likelihood 
of employing violent force during its commission.  
126 Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204, 1217 (2018).  
127 See id. at 1233 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (“Plausibly, anyway, the word ‘nature’ 
might refer to an inevitable characteristic of the offense; one that would present itself 
automatically, whenever the statute is violated. While I remain open to different arguments 
about our precedent and the proper reading of language like this, I would address them in 
another case, whether involving the INA or a different statute, where the parties have a 
chance to be heard and we might benefit from their learning.” (citation omitted)). 
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Furthermore, the risk-of-force clause applies “a qualitative risk standard to 
‘real-world facts or statutory elements’” by requiring “an ultimate determination of 
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt—by a jury, in the same proceeding.”128 This reduces 
the ambiguity stemming from both modalities that undermined the residual clause, 
as there is no longer grave uncertainty in estimating the risk posed by an ordinary 
offense, nor about how much risk is needed to qualify.129  
Third, the risk-of-force clause also contains the “‘narrowing aspect[]’ of 
‘requiring that the risk of physical force arise “in the course of” committing the 
offense.’”130 This prevents courts from considering factors “‘remote from the 
criminal act,’ a consideration that supported the Court’s vagueness analysis in 
Johnson.”131 It further fulfills the purpose of punishing those willing to put others at 
risk of violence but differentiates between those who incidentally cause harm in the 
course of their criminal conduct.132 This contrasts with “the wide judicial latitude 
permitted by the ACCA’s coverage of crimes that involve conduct presenting a 
serious risk of injury,”133 a determination which stands independent of the offender’s 
intent and one which inexcusably permits a court to “evaluate the risk of injury 
arising after the crime has been completed.”134  
The Court in Dimaya half-heartedly dismissed this distinction as not 
meaningful given the “ordinary case” approach, reasoning that the risk only occurs 
during the commission anyway.135 Under traditional canons of interpretation, “all 
words of a statute [are to] be given effect if possible . . . .”136 The Court seems to 
deliberately misconstrue the language of the risk-of-force clause to make it seem as 
though any conduct during the crime, from start to finish, should be considered in 
determining an ordinary crime. An alternative view, encompassing the reality of the 
                                               
128 Shuti v. Lynch, 828 F.3d 440, 449 (6th Cir. 2016) (quoting Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 
2561). 
129 While there may remain a certain degree of uncertainty in determining the 
applicability of the clause, it is within the tolerable levels and beyond vagueness challenges. 
The no-set-of-circumstances rule overlooked by the Johnson court holds that “a law is 
facially invalid ‘only if the enactment is impermissibly vague in all of its applications.’” 
Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2581, 2581 n.2. (Alito, J., dissenting) (quoting Hoffman Estates v. 
Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 494–95 (1982)). 
130 United States v. Prickett, 839 F.3d 697, 699 (8th Cir. 2016) (quoting United States 
v. Taylor, 814 F.3d 340, 376–77); see also Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2562 (emphasizing that the 
ACCA required courts to review conduct that happened after the offense’s conclusion). 
131 Prickett, 839 F.3d at 699 (internal quotations omitted). 
132 See Voisine v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2272, 2284 (2016) (Thomas, J., dissenting) 
(opining that the “‘use of physical force’ connotes an intentional act” and recklessness is 
insufficient to warrant an enhanced sentence). 
133 Prickett, 839 F.3d at 699 (alterations incorporated) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
134 United States v. Taylor, 814 F.3d 340, 377 (6th Cir. 2016) (citing Johnson, 135 S. 
Ct. at 2557). 
135 Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204, 1208 (2018). 
136 LARRY M. EIG, supra note 48. 
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statute’s plain language, points to conduct inherent in that crime’s commission when 
read as a whole.137 That is, the words “in the course of” should be understood to 
mean “necessary for the commission of.”138 This interpretation lends to the 
deliberateness with which violent force must be applied, rather than when violent 
force might occur. Accidental or incidental harms were not the target of the risk-of-
force clause, but could rightly be included in the residual clause.139 Because the risk-
of-force clause restricts qualifying offenses to those that generate the risk necessary 
to its accomplishment, it again reduces the level of ambiguity and diminishes the 
likelihood a court could arbitrarily apply the enhancement.  
Each of the aforementioned factors is important, not only individually, but 
collectively. If the risk-of-force clause were distinct in only one aspect, it might fail 
to overcome the greater uncertainty which doomed the residual clause.140 As one 
court later observed, “Johnson did not invalidate the ACCA residual clause because 
the clause employed an ordinary case analysis, but rather because of a greater sum 
of several uncertainties” which “may be tolerable in isolation.”141 The cumulative 
effect of the textual differences lessens 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(B)’s aggregate 
vagueness and uncertainty enough to make the statute constitutional.142 However, 
the textual dissimilarities are not the sole source providing criteria by which to 
distinguish between the two statutes.  
 
B.  Contextual Differences 
 
Another way to distinguish the two statutes is by examining the contextual 
differences under which the statutes exist. These are present in two forms; The first 
difference concerns the holistic historic context of each statute. This is important to 
consider given the unique circumstances under which the residual clause was 
invalidated.143 The second is the contextual difference found in the framework of the 
statutory body which shapes the meaning and application of a statute’s subsections. 
                                               
137 See Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. at 1237 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“Properly interpreted, 
this means the statute requires a substantial risk that the perpetrator will use force while 
carrying out the crime.”) (emphasis added). 
138 The House Subcommittee on Crime opined that the bill enacting 924(c) should be 
altered because as it is written, proving the crime’s “element[s] would involve additional 
analysis of the defendant’s conduct, the circumstances of the violent crime and evidence of 
the defendant’s state of mind. It would be a substantial burden on the prosecution and is 
unnecessary to prevent injustice.” See H.R. REP. No. 99-495, at 9 (1986). Thus, the 
legislators understood this language to call for a fact specific inquiry into the offense rather 
than an “ordinary case” analysis or a categorical approach.  
139 See id. (“[Section] 16(b) . . . does not cover offenses where the danger arises from 
the offender’s negligent or accidental conduct . . . .”).  
140 See supra note 100 and accompanying text. 
141 United States v. Taylor, 814 F.3d 340, 378 (6th Cir. 2016). 
142 Shuti v. Lynch, 828 F.3d 440, 450 (6th Cir. 2016). 
143 See Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2557; Little, supra note 38. 
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As explained below, this is accomplished by both qualifying statements and 
restrictive applications.  
A primary distinction in the historical context is that “§ 924(c)’s [risk-of-force] 
clause has not been subject to the same kind of uncertainty in application that long 
plagued the residual clause of the ACCA and ultimately led the Supreme Court to 
strike that clause.”144 Johnson was exceptional. It was a product of the Court’s 
frustration with Congress’s lack of response to the Court’s decade-long struggle to 
define the clause,145 which caused the Court to cry, “no más.”146 As discussed above, 
prior to Johnson, the Court interpreted the ACCA clause four times and applied four 
different analyses to it within a five-year period.147 The Court was frustrated not only 
with its own inability to define a workable standard, but with the ensuing confusion 
it caused among federal judges who sought to follow the Court’s awkward and 
shifting guidance, as well as the pressure placed upon defendants to plead guilty to 
lesser offenses in order to avoid the uncertainty of incurring a sentence enhancement 
should they risk fighting the charges.148 It was only after the Court’s failed efforts 
that Justice Scalia reiterated that “the life of the law is experience” and concluded 
that the Court’s poignant experience with the residual clause over a decade left only 
“guesswork and intuition.”149 In contrast, the Court has not articulated varying 
standards for the risk-of-force clause, nor has it been petitioned to resolve 
ambiguities on multiple occasions within only a few years. As Justice Scalia 
indicated, only experience can reveal a statute to be unconstitutionally unwieldy.150 
                                               
144 In re Smith, 829 F.3d 1276, 1279 (11th Cir. 2016) (noting “Johnson decline[d] to 
expressly invalidate § 924(c)'s residual clause”); see also United States v. Breshers, No. 10-
40107-01-SAC, 2017 WL 2378349, at *4 (D. Kan. June 1, 2017) (finding consistency in the 
application of the risk-of-force clause among the Third, Eighth, Ninth, Eleventh, and Fifth 
Circuits); United States v. Bowen, 228 F. Supp. 3d 1204, 1209 (D. Colo. 2017) (noting the 
differences of applicable standards for the ACCA and the risk-of-force clause); Lloyd v. 
United States, No. CIV 16-0513 JB/WPL, 2016 WL 5387665, at *3 (D.N.M. Aug. 31, 2016) 
(“The lower courts have noted no similar concerns [of vague or confusing application] with 
§ 924(c)(3)(B).”). 
145 See Little, supra note 38. 
146 Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. at 1239 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
147 See Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2558–59; Sykes v. United States, 564 U.S. 1, 4 (2011); 
Chambers v. United States, 555 U.S. 122, 130 (2009); Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 
139 (2008); James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192, 195 (2007); see also supra notes 30–34 
and accompanying text. 
148 See Little, supra note 38. (“The problem with the [residual] clause has been that 
many people—including federal judges and Justices—cannot agree as to what non-violent 
offenses should ‘categorically’ fit this general definition. And as Chief Justice John Roberts 
pointed out . . . uncertainty about the clause’s meaning . . . can pressure defendants to plead 
guilty to lesser offenses rather than risk fifteen years in jail.”). 
149 Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2559–60. 
150 See id. at 2562 (“Experience is all the more instructive when the decision in question 
rejected a claim of unconstitutional vagueness. Unlike other judicial mistakes that need 
correction, the error of having rejected a vagueness challenge manifests itself precisely in 
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The Court simply has not had this experience with the risk-of-force clause.151  
The second contextual differences between the two statutes is found in the 
framework of the statutory body in the form of a qualifying statement. The residual 
clause is proceeded by an enumerated list of offenses.152 The clause states that a 
violent felony is a felony that “is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves use of 
explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of 
physical injury to another.”153 This confusing attempt to establish an underlying link 
between the listed offenses is one defect from which the residual clause suffers. 
Justice Scalia emphasized this by writing in comparison, “[t]he phrase ‘shades of 
red,’ standing alone, does not generate confusion or unpredictability; but the phrase 
‘fire-engine red, light pink, maroon, navy blue, or colors that otherwise involve 
shades of red’ assuredly does so.”154 But, a “required nexus to the enumerated 
crimes . . . [is not] an infirmity from which” the risk-of-force clause suffers.155 The 
list of enumerated crimes obscures the “degree of risk” required because the listed 
offenses are an odd combination lacking a common class of risk.156 While a 
“confusing list” of offenses was not dispositive for Johnson, it contributed to 
“significantly less predictability” in the clause’s application and was an additional 
factor lending to the residual clause’s grave uncertainty.157 The lack of an 
inconsistent, enumerated list of offenses lends credibility to the risk-of-force 
clause.158  
                                               
subsequent judicial decisions: the inability of later opinions to impart the predictability that 
the earlier opinion forecast. Here, the experience of the federal courts leaves no doubt about 
the unavoidable uncertainty and arbitrariness of adjudication under the residual clause . . . . 
[T]he provision remains . . . ‘a black hole of confusion and uncertainty’ . . . .” (internal 
citations omitted)). 
151 Arbitrary enforcement was also a fatal feature of the INA clause because the ACCA 
standards were “regularly applied” despite differing statutory language. Golicov v. Lynch, 
837 F.3d 1065, 1074 (10th Cir. 2016). In contrast, courts do not apply the ACCA standards 
to the risk-of-force clause. See Shuti v. Lynch, 828 F.3d 440, 449 (6th Cir. 2016) (2018).  
152 See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B) (2012). 
153 Id. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) (emphasis added). 
154 Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2561 (quoting James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192, 230 n.7 
(2007) (Scalia, J., dissenting)). 
155 DOYLE, supra note 72, at 5.  
156 Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2558. 
157 Id. at 2561 (noting that other risk clauses are saved from scrutiny because they are 
not linked to a “confusing list of examples”); United States v. Hill, 832 F.3d 135, 146 (2d 
Cir. 2016) (“[T]he risk-of-force clause contains no mystifying list of offenses and no 
indeterminate ‘otherwise’ phraseology—a defining feature of the ACCA's residual clause 
that, in [Johnson], was understood to add an additional layer of uncertainty as to ‘how much 
risk it takes for a crime to qualify as a violent felony.’” (citation omitted)). But see Golicov 
v. Lynch, 837 F.3d 1065, 1074 (10th Cir. 2016) (noting the absence of enumerated crimes 
was not one of the two determinative features used to invalidate the ACCA clause). 
158 Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204, 1239 (2018) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“The 
enumerated offenses, and our Court's failed attempts to make sense of them, were essential 
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Furthermore, the risk-of-force clause is distinguishable because of its restricted 
application as designated by the statutory framework. The clause applies only when 
an individual uses or carries a firearm “during and in relation to,” or possesses a 
firearm “in furtherance of,” a “crime of violence.”159 This requisite nexus is not a 
part of the broader residual clause found in § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii), but it is specific to 
§ 924(c).160 The additional criterion ensures that predicate offenses include the risks 
inherent when an offender employs a firearm during the commission of a crime.161 
It therefore allows less indeterminacy about whether a predicate offense involves 
risk-creation because firearms, when used for crime, inherently introduce a risk of 
violence.162 The risk posed by the use of a firearm is in addition to the risk of the use 
of physical force inherent in an underlying offense. This double layer of risk makes 
it all the less likely that the courts could arbitrarily apply the clause.  
Finally, § 924(c)(3)(B) “appl[ies] a qualitative risk standard to ‘real-world facts 
or statutory elements’” by “requir[ing] an ultimate determination of guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt—by a jury, in the same proceeding.”163 The retrospective 
assessment of qualifying crime made necessary by the residual clause’s premise of 
three previous convictions is not a deficiency from which the risk-of-force clause 
suffers because the application of § 924(c)(3)(B) is concurrent with the trial for the 
underlying crime.164 The Supreme Court has emphasized that “[t]he residual clause 
failed not because it adopted a ‘serious potential risk’ standard but because applying 
that standard under the categorical approach required courts to assess the 
hypothetical risk posed by an abstract generic version of the offense.”165 Because 
the application of the risk-of-force clause is concurrent, the categorical approach is 
                                               
to Johnson’s conclusion that the residual clause ‘leaves uncertainty about how much risk it 
takes for a crime to qualify as a violent felony.’” (citing Johnson, 130 S. Ct. at 2558)). 
159 18 U.S.C. § 924 (c)(1)(A) (2012). 
160 Id.; 18 U.S.C. § 924 (e)(2)(B)(ii). 
161 See supra note 138. 
162 See generally United States v. Dillard, 214 F.3d 88, 93 (2d Cir. 2000) (“Firearms are 
instruments designed for the use of violent physical force . . . Possession of a gun greatly 
increases one’s ability to inflict harm on others and therefore involves 
some risk of violence.”). 
163 Shuti v. Lynch, 828 F.3d 440, 449 (6th Cir. 2016) (quoting Johnson v. United States, 
135 S. Ct. 2551, 2561); see id. (finding § 16(b) as unconstitutionally vague but affirming a 
previous ruling that § 924 (c)(3)(b) is constitutional).  
164 The residual risk clause looks to previous conduct: “In the case of a person who 
violates section 922(g) of this title and has three previous convictions . . . .” 18 U.S.C. § 924 
e(1) (2012) (emphasis added).  
165 Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1257, 1262 (2016); see United States v. Taylor, 
814 F.3d 340, 378 (6th Cir. 2016) (“Johnson did not invalidate the ACCA residual clause 
because the clause employed an ordinary case analysis, but rather because of a greater sum 
of several uncertainties . . . [which] may be tolerable in isolation.”) (quoting Johnson, 135 S. 
Ct. at 2560). 
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unnecessary.166 The sentencing official has the exact facts of the case and underlying 
conviction readily available and could eliminate a great deal of uncertainty by using 
the “underlying-conduct approach.”167 This difference eliminates one level of 
uncertainty at issue in Johnson and is sufficient to “uphold the constitutionality of 
18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(B).”168  
After examining the potential extension of Johnson to the risk-of-force clause, 
this Note concludes—as have a majority of the courts of appeals which have 
considered the issue—that the statute is not so ambiguous or vague that it is 
unconstitutional. The textual and contextual factors are sufficient to distinguish the 
risk-of-force clause from the residual clause. And the apparent similarities are 
insufficient to warrant extending Johnson or Dimaya to invalidate the clause because 
the uncertainty that remains is within the range of what is tolerable. This conclusion 
preserves Justice Scalia’s assurance that “we do not doubt the constitutionality of 
laws that call for the application of a qualitative standard such as ‘substantial risk’ 
to real-world conduct”169 and stems the expanding tide of void-for-vagueness 
doctrine.170 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
In sum, the risk-of-force clause is distinguishable from the residual clause. The 
statute is textually narrower than the residual clause and encompasses less conduct 
                                               
166 United States v. Cravens, 719 F. App’x 810, 818–19 (10th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 
No. 17-8796, 2018 WL 2118861 (2018) (“A number of district courts have also questioned 
the use of the categorical approach in § 924(c) cases . . . It is time to re-think our use of the 
categorical approach in § 924(c) cases. Easily determined facts are always preferable to rank 
speculation . . . [W]hile the statutory language between the Armed Career Criminal Act 
(ACCA), which was the genesis of the categorical approach, and 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3) may 
be similar, the question of whether a crime is a crime of violence arises in significantly 
different contexts under the two statutes.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); United States 
v. Kennedy, 720 F. App’x 104, 110 (3d Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 1601 (2018) 
(“[T]he rationales for applying the categorical approach were not present when the predicate 
offense was tried contemporaneously before the same court.” (citing United States v. 
Robinson, 844 F.3d 137, 142 (3rd Cir. 2016))). 
167 Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204, 1255 (2018) (Thomas, J., dissenting) 
(advocating the adoption of the underlying-conduct approach because the ordinary case 
analysis is unworkable); Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2578–80 (Alito, J., dissenting) (inviting the 
court to abandon the categorical approach in favor of a fact specific inquiry). But see Dimaya, 
138 S. Ct. at 1217 (rejecting the underlying conduct approach and finding that the “Court 
adopted the categorical approach in part to ‘avoid[ ] the Sixth Amendment concerns that 
would arise from sentencing courts’ making findings of fact that properly belong to juries.’” 
(quoting Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254, 267 (2013))). 
168 Shuti, 828 F.3d at 450.  
169 Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2561. 
170 See Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. at 1242 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“I am also skeptical that 
the vagueness doctrine can be justified as a way to prevent delegations of core legislative 
power in this context.”). 
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with more definitive standards for determining predicate offenses. It is qualified by 
the statutory framework and additional requirements imposed by precedent. The 
risk-of-force clause has been consistently applied, suffers from no confusing 
interpretive applications, and addresses a specific and identifiable set of offenses. 
Thus, it is not so vague that it fails to give ordinary people fair notice of the conduct 
it punishes, or so standardless that it invites arbitrary enforcement. Simply put, the 
risk-of-force clause does not contain the aggregate ambiguity necessary to warrant 
invalidation. When it is considered by the Supreme Court, it should not be found to 
be so vague that it is beyond what the Constitution tolerates. 
